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Abstract—In order to maximize resource utilization as well as 
providing trust management in grid, we propose a novel 
framework – Trust-Incentive Resource Management (TIM). 
Having child model, club model, bid model and trust model, TIM 
dynamically manages grid resource by integrating values of prices, 
trust, and incentive. In this mechanism, providers set the price ac-
cording to demand and supply, and consumers maximize the sur-
plus upon budget and deadline. A weighted voting scheme is also 
proposed to secure the grid system by declining the join request 
from malicious nodes. A TIM prototype has been successfully im-
plemented in a real grid system, CROWN grid. We evaluate the 
proposed approach through comprehensive experiments and 
achieve improved results in resource allocation efficiency, system 
completion time, and aggregated resource utilization. 
Keywords-resource allocation; incentive; trust; CROWN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A dilemma in grid computing area is that when every par-
ticipating node tries to maximize its own utility, the overall util-
ity of the collaboration might drop. In the worst case scenario, 
grid resources are easily depleted due to selfish users taking free 
rides without offering any sharing resource. Unfortunately, such 
“tragedy of the commons” phenomenon also happens in a num-
ber of existing grid systems where cooperated scientific re-
search grid systems emphasize on sharing resource voluntarily. 
Apparently, certain resource management scheme has to be im-
plemented on grid systems to achieve better scalability[1-4,17].  
To encourage resource sharing, several previous  works 
adopt soft incentive schemes[5-7], which is essentially a reputa-
tion system. Nodes get higher degree of trust by sharing more 
resources, and thus have the permission to access other re-
sources. Soft incentive cannot meet the requirement of grid sys-
tems in that providers not only care about the reputation, but 
also wish to gain benefit by providing resources. Other works 
adopt hard incentive scheme[1, 4], in which nodes get virtual 
currency by selling their resources, and then use the currency to 
bid for other resources. However, the assumption, wealthy 
nodes are more trustful, is not always valid. Simply considering 
the bid price in resource allocation cannot satisfy the security 
concerns from different participating organizations.  
In order to tackle the mentioned above issues, we combine 
the soft incentive and hard incentive schemes and propose a 
Trust-Incentive Compatible Dynamic Resource Management 
framework, called TIM. The primary goals of TIM are securing 
shared resources, promoting users to share valuable resources, 
maintaining the balance of supply and demand in competitive 
grid resource market, and finally maximizing aggregate re-
source utilization. Major contributions are summarized as fol-
lows. 
(1) By adopting a continual exchange process and matching 
user resource requests with available resources, we propose the 
TIM model which can maximize aggregate resource utilization 
in an economically and computationally efficient manner. In 
this model, users can get more only if they are willing to share 
more and having higher degree of trust. As a result, it promotes 
collaborators to share more valuable resources and avoid mali-
cious waste. 
(2) In a grid system, price fluctuates when resource supply 
and demand changes. We separate the role of providers and 
consumers and apply different strategies to each role. Providers 
simply mark their price based on supply and demand while con-
sumers offer their bids upon deadline and budget constraints. 
Because the resource dynamics are included in our management 
model, the workload of providers is balanced and the efficiency 
of grid system is improved.  
(3) Nodes may join or leave a grid system randomly. To 
prevent a system from being attacked by malicious nodes, we 
employ a weighted voting scheme in TIM, such that a secure 
environment is constructed. 
(4) We have successfully implemented TIM in the key pro-
ject of our lab, CROWN grid. Our implementation experiences 
and experimental results are valuable to research peers. II.  RELATED WORK 
The objective of resource incentive is to promote users to 
share more resources. Generally speaking, there are two incen-
tive schemes: Soft Incentive[5-7] and Hard Incentive [1, 4, 8-
10].  
Soft incentive includes two models, Peer-Approved and 
Service-Quality. Peers in [5] are allowed to access resources 
only from others with a lower or equal ratings, and the QoS 
provided to these peers also can be differentiated. Feldman [6] 
proposes a Reciprocative decision function, and introduces the 
notion of generosity. Richard et al. [7] present an allocation 
mechanism for bandwidth resource and introduce the notion of 
contribution to maximize utilization. In essence, soft incentive 
in above work is a reputation system where the reputation [5] 
(or generosity[6], contribution[7]) of a peer is consistent with 
the utility and quantity of resources supplied by the peer, but no 
price mechanism is involved in above systems.  
There have been many researches in resource management 
approach which are based on economic models [1, 4, 8-10]. Re-
source management based on price scheme can be treated as 
hard incentive, which adopts a Token-Exchange approach. Each 
first-time user might be allotted a fixed number of tokens, but 
once these run out, the user has to serve resources to earn to-
kens. Chun [1] allocates resources using a combinatorial auc-
tion that allows users to express preferences with complemen-
tarities. Feldman [8] presents a price-anticipating resource allo-
cation mechanism. In their work, each user can reach the Nash 
equilibrium by iteratively applying a best response algorithm to 
adapt his bids. Resource allocation in above researches mainly 
considers the bid price of consumers, that is, the higher price 
the node bids, the more resources the node gets. However, 
wealthy nodes are not always with higher degree reputation. 
Only considering the bid price in resource allocation cannot sat-
isfy the security concerns from different participating organiza-
tions.
The TIM we proposed combines features from both soft in-
centive approach and hard incentive approach. The framework 
is dynamic oriented and completely distributed. Such design 
allows better scalability when managing practical grid resources. 
The weighted voting scheme included in our work can decline 
suspicious nodes from joining the grid system and therefore 
maintaining a secure and balanced grid environment. 
III.  SYSTEM MODEL  
The key project in our lab, CROWN (China R&D Environ-
ment Over Wide-area Network), is aiming at empowering in-
depth integration of resources and cooperation of researchers 
nationwide and worldwide. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the distrib-
uted resource management in CROWN grid adopts a two-tier 
peer-to-peer architecture[11-13]. The super layer is the back-
bone consisting of CDRSes (CROWN Distributed Resource 
Server); the child layer includes all clients and resource provid-
ers. Each club consists of one CDRS and multiple child nodes, 
such as Clubj in Fig. 1. Each CDRS will periodically publish the 
provision resources. A child node selects the desired resource, 
generates the corresponding bids, and transmits them to the se-
lected CDRS by its own parent CDRS. 
We first propose our TIM model, including four building 
blocks, i.e. CHILD model, CLUB model, BIDS model, and 
TRUST model. Suppose that there are p clubs (that is, p 
CDRSes), and each club may have n types of resources. Let 
Clubj denote the jth Club (j=1,", p), and 
i
j Child denote the ith 
child node in Clubj.  
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[0,1] ∈ is the recommendation trust value from CDRS in Clubj 
to CDRS in Clubi.  
BIDS Model Bids is defined as (cid, pid, et, Q, (q
1, q
2, …, q
n), 
directtrust, C, V): cid∈{1, ", p}, pid N ∈  to denote the bid 
coming from 
pid
cid Child ; a estimated job execution time et; a de-
sired quantity Q≥1 of nodes; q
1, q
2, … , q
n to denote the tth 
(1 , , ) tn = " type resource quantity required by the consumer; a 
direct trust value directtrust [0,1] ∈  of  the 
pid
cid Child ;  a set of 
constraints C, such as deadline and budget, etc; and a bidding 
price V that the consumer is willing to pay.   
Figure 1.The two-tier architecture of TIM 
TRUST Model We adopt the trust model used in [14]. If T1 de-
notes a recommendation trust value from A to B, and T2 denotes 
a direct trust value from B to C, then the trust value from A to C 
is  2
1 11)
T T －（ － . We suppose that nodes in the same club have 
direct trust relations, nodes in different clubs have indirect trust 
relations, and CDRSes have recommendation trust relations. 
We get the following trust inference.  
(1) Direct trust computing. After nodes in Clubi use the re-
sources of 
k
i Child to execute jobs, the nodes will report positive 
or negative experiences to the CDRS in Clubi. A direct trust re-
lationship will set up only if all experiences with 
k
i Child that 
the CDRS in Clubi knows about are positive experiences. Let q 
be the number of positive experiences, then the direct trust 
value from the CDRS to 
k
i Child  is  1
kq
i directtrust λ =− , 
whereλ  is the probability of reliability with a single task;  
(2) Recommendation trust computing. After nodes in Clubj 
have used the resources of nodes in Clubi to execute jobs, the 
nodes in Clubj will report positive or negative experiences to the 
CDRS in Clubj. Given numbers of positive and negative experi-
ences p and n, the recommendation trust value from the CDRS 
of Clubj to the CDRS of Clubi is： 
rectrustji(p, n)= 
  1 
0           
pnif p n
else
λ
−  −> 

 
; 
(3) The trust value from Clubj to 
k
i Child  is : 
1( 1 )
ji kk
ii
rectrust
trust directtrust =− − . 
IV.  DESIGN OF TIM 
In this section, we present our TIM framework to manage 
shared resources in CROWN.  
A.  Provider price strategy 
Smale Theorem [15]: For a market with n (n 2 ≥ ) types of 
commodity, P = (p1,", pn) is the price vector at some moment, 
where 0( 1, , ) i p in ≥= " is the price of the ith commodity. Let 
D, S, E denote supply vector, demand vector, and excess vector 
of commodities (E=D-S), and D, S, E be the functions on the 
price vector P. If the equilibrium point of market exists, then 
E(P
*) = 0, where P
* denotes the equilibrium price. By default, 
the equilibrium point cannot be reached automatically. Rather, 
it can be reached only by continually adjusting the price accord-
ing to () () E DP
dP
Ep
dt
µ ×= , where  () ( )
l
En n
m
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e
p
×
∂
=
∂
, 
l
m
e
p
∂
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denotes the partial derivative of the excess quantity of the lth 
type commodity to the price of the mth type commodity, and 
µ denotes a coefficient with the same sign as  ( ) E DP . 
In particular, it is impossible to use Smale’s method directly 
[9] because grid economy is inherently discrete and the partial 
derivatives that the method requires do not exist. However, we 
are able to get good approximations for the partials at a given 
price vector. Starting with a price vector, the preferences at 
price vectors can be obtained by fixing all but one price and 
varying the remaining price slightly. Once achieving a “secant” 
approximation for each commodity, we substitute these ap-
proximations for the values of the partial derivatives in the ma-
trix ( ) E DP , discretize with respect to time, solve for a price vec-
tor, and iterate.  
Definition Let Sj, Dj, Ej, Pj denote supply vector, demand 
vector, excess vector, and price vector in Clubj, respectively. 
Obviously, E j =  D j-Sj, and Sj,  Dj,  Ej are the functions of Pj. 
If
* ()0 jj EP= , then Clubj reaches the balance, where
*
j P is the 
equilibrium price. The unit of price is given in “grid dollars” 
(G$).  
In the grid, let the coefficient µ  be 1, dt be the step length 
of the time for adjusting per unit price, and dP be the difference 
of two continues price. For example, suppose there are four 
types of resource in Clubj, CPU, memory, disk, and bandwidth. 
The current price and excess vector are Pj=(2G$, 6G$, 9G$, 
4G$) and Ej =(200, 0, 300, 100). With the resource exchange 
records, the CDRS in Clubj find that when the price of some 
resource is increased one unit, the increased supply quantity is 
20 units, and the decreased demand quantity is 30 units. The 
decreased demand quantity of other types of resource is 10 units.  
1
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p
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p
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Thus,
12 3 4 5, 0, 7.5,  2.5 pp p p ∆= −∆= ∆= ∆= − . We use 
the following formula  {, }
kk max p p ε +∆   to determine a new 
resource price, where 0 ε >  is a small constant preventing prices 
to approach zero value.  
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Clubj 
k 
child layer 
super layer  CDRS 
CDRS  CDRS 
CDRS 
CDRS B.  Consumer price strategy 
Each grid user generates the combination of resources for its 
tasks according to their requirements, and submits the corre-
sponding combination to a selected CDRS that the user will bid 
for. The goal of each grid user is to maximize its own surplus 
upon deadline and budget constraints. Given the average price 
node
j P  of each node in the Clubj and the completion time con-
straint T, the utility function of each grid user can be expressed 
as follows: 
() ( )
node
j UV KT L P V V =− −  
in which L is the length of the job, V is the payment value of the 
user, 
node
j LPV  is the estimated job execution time, and K is a 
constant coefficient defined by the user. Thus, the utility opti-
mization problem above can be written as:  
 ()
   () )
..    ( ) 0
node
j
Max U V
g VT L P V
st gV


≥ 
(= -  
By using the multiplicator method, we obtain the approximative 
optimal solution  3( 2 )
node
j VL P T K
∗ =−  as the bidding price, 
that is, the value V in BIDS model. 
C.  Trust-incentive compatible resource allocation algo-
rithm 
After collecting the consumers’ bids, the CDRS of each club 
uses the TIM mechanism to allocate resources as the following 
greedy algorithm. 
TABLE Ⅰ. TIM ALGORITHM 
1:  Calculate the per unit valuation  ()
iii
jjj bidi
j VQe t =×  for each bid in 
Clubj 
2:  Scale each bidi
j using the formula
im a x
jj bi
j bid bid =  
3:  Calculate the evaluation value of each bid byevlbidi
j =  
(1 )
ip i d
j cid trust b αα ×+ −× ,  [0,1] α ∈  is risk degree of Clubj 
4:  Sort all bids in descending order according to evlbidi
j  
5:  for all bids in the sorted bid list do 
6:    if the resource request for a bid can be fulfilled with the 
   remaining node resources then  
7:         allocate the resources to the bid. 
8:    end if 
9:  end for  
D.  Dynamic management for nodes 
Nodes may join and leave the collaboration dynamically, or 
transfer from one club to another club. Thus, some CDRSes 
maybe have the trust records for a child node. In our TIM ap-
proach, the more resources a  
node provides, the higher degree of trust a node has. Obvi-
ously, every node is willing to cooperate with a node with 
higher trust value.  
As illustrated in Fig. 1, when the CDRS in Clubj receives 
the join request, it will propagate the join request to other 
CDRSes. Since each club may have different trust records and 
recommendation trust value, it may have different opinions 
about the requesting node. In our proposal, this is solved by 
employing a weighted voting scheme to decide whether to ac-
cept the requesting node or not. After receiving the vote request, 
the CDRSes make their own decisions as:  
  1     >
  0    
 -1    <
i
trust
vote no trust value record
trust
τ
τ
  = 
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where  [0,1] τ ∈ is the configuration threshold value used by 
each CDRS. The result will then be returned to the voting spon-
sor. According to the majority principle, the CDRS in Clubj 
uses the constraint in equation 
1
0
p
ji i
i
rectrust vote
=
≥ ∑  to make the 
final decision.  
V.  IMPLEMENTATION 
We have implemented the TIM approach in CROWN sys-
tem with Java. The cooperation facility among nodes is pro-
vided by CROWN grid, a fully decentralized grid middleware 
infrastructure. In the setup phase, we created five clubs [16], 
and each club has a CDRS and 40-50 virtual child nodes. 
A.  Efficiency of allocation mechanism  
We first conduct an experiment with a set of five peers with 
varying currency and trust value, bidding for some portion of 
200 unit resources. In the experiment, the amount of resource 
that each bid i can obtain is determined by 
ii
i
TotalResources evlbid evlbid × ∑ . We adopt this distribution 
policy to protect light users against starvation from heavy users 
when the demand is over the supply. To evaluate TIM, we first 
define a metric named allocation_ratio for each bid as follows. 
=_ _ _ allocation_ratio allocation quantity total request quantity 
In this experiment, we assume that the total request quantity of 
each node is 100 units. There are five curves in Figures 2 and 3, 
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Figure 2. .Incentive compatible allocation  Figure 3.Trust incentive allocation  Figure 4.Completion ratio vs. dynamic system load 
 
the allocation ratio. We first set the risk degree  1 α =  in Fig. 2 
and consider the security factor and set the risk degree  0.2 α =  
in Fig. 3. The symbol S in both figures denotes the ratio of pro-
viding resources, for example, the first node provides 90 per-
cent of local resources to other nodes. The symbol T in Fig. 3 
denotes the trust value of bidding nodes. In the first three peri-
ods, only two nodes request for resources and the supply meets 
the demand. Thus the allocation ratios for the two nodes are all 
100 percent. After the third period, the increasing bids outnum-
bered the supply. 
As shown in Fig. 2, without the security consideration, the 
nodes providing the same resources nearly obtain the same allo-
cation ratio. However, if considering the trust value in Fig. 3, 
we can see that the provision ratio of node 3 (60%) is less than 
that of node 1 (90%), but node 3 has a higher trust value 
(T=0.6) and thus obtains more resources than node 1. Similarly, 
node 2 and node 4 have the same provision ratio: 30%. Node 2 
obtains more resources than node 4 at the sixth bid in Fig. 3, 
because the trust value of node 2 (T=0.8) is far greater than that 
of node 4 (T=0.1). 
B.  Impact of TIM price strategy  
This experiment is to study characteristics of price setting 
strategy with Round-Robin strategy in terms of job completion 
time, which is measured from accessing the requested grid re-
sources till task is accomplished. Three clubs are the resource 
providers, with each having 200 unit resources. Resource re-
quests are generated by the child nodes and the bid is generated 
at an interval of 350 time units. We change the system load 
from 0.1 to 0.9 with a step of 0.1, where system load is defined 
as a ratio of aggregate bids load to aggregated capability of pro-
viders. The initial value of the resource price is 50G$, and each 
CDRS re-publishes the resource price with an interval of 500 
time units. In Fig. 4, we contrast the performance between TIM 
price direction strategy and Round-Robin strategy with system 
load at 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively. From Fig.4, we can see 
that TIM price setting strategy has better efficiency and spends 
less time to complete tasks compared with the Round-Robin 
strategy, especially at higher bids. At 10,000 time units, the 
completion ratio for Round-Robin strategy is only around 64%, 
while our price direction strategy can score 83% of the comple-
tion ratios.  
C.  Evaluation of trust model 
Malicious nodes may exist in grid environments to disturb 
resource exchange. We consider the security problem from both 
sides, including malicious consumers and malicious providers. 
On one hand, when bidding for resources, a malicious consumer 
can either set a higher bit value arbitrarily or does not give the 
corresponding payment. Such behaviors adversely affect the 
interests of resource providers. On the other side, a malicious 
provider can boast of having more resources to get more cur-
rency. It makes good providers losing the bids. 
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Figure 5. Prevention of malicious consumers  Figure 6. Prevention of malicious providers  Figure 7. Recommendation trust varying of CDRSes  We first study how malicious consumers affect the grid sys-
tem. In this experiment, there are three clubs and 40 nodes in 
each club are resource providers. 100 nodes from the other two 
clubs act as consumers and generate bids. We let the three pro-
viding clubs receive the 100 bids each time by varying the per-
centage of malicious consumers from 0 to 0.9 with a step of 0.1. 
For each scenario, a set of risk degreeα in TIM are configured: 
0, 0.5, and 1. As shown in Fig. 5, the club considering both 
benefit and security factors ( 0.5) α = obtains more revenue af-
ter the percentage of malicious consumers is over 20%. When 
the percentage of malicious consumers is over 80%, the club 
considering only the security factors will get more revenue. 
We then study how malicious providers affect the grid sys-
tem. In the simulations, Club1 implements admission control 
based on the TIM weighted voting scheme, while Club2 dose 
not. Both clubs have 40 resource providers and are handling 40 
bids. Consider the case when 40 nodes from the other three 
clubs want to join Club1 and Club2. Still, we set the percentage 
of malicious join peers from 0 to 0.9 with a step of 0.1. The 
CDRS in Club1 set the admission policy τ =0.3, which means 
that the node whose trust value is lower than 0.3 will not be ac-
cepted. As a result, few malicious nodes are able to join Club1, 
while many of them can join Club2. 
As Shown in Fig. 6, when the percentage of malicious join 
increases, the revenue of both clubs decreases. But the revenue 
of Club2 without TIM is suffering much more than Club1 with 
TIM. At the extreme case when all the new nodes are malicious 
nodes, the revenue of Club2 is only 60 percent of the revenue of 
Club1. Fig. 7 shows that as more malicious nodes enter Club2, 
the recommendation trust value of the CDRS in Club2 without 
TIM de crease rapidly. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Proving trust and incentive in grid computing environments 
are of great importance. This paper presents a Trust-Incentive 
Compatible Dynamic Resource Management, TIM, on the basis 
of economy model and trust model. By introducing the price 
strategy, trust-incentive compatible resource allocation mecha-
nism and the weighted voting scheme, TIM encourges nodes to 
share more resources, ensures the balance of supply and de-
mand, enhances the aggregated resource utilization, and main-
tains the secure environment of a grid computing system.  
TIM scheme has been successfully implemented in our key 
project, CROWN grid environment. We evaluate our proposed 
approach by comprehensive experiments and achieved much 
improved results in resource allocation, system completion time 
and aggregated resource utilization.  
In the future, we will widely deploy our TIM approach in 
the CROWN grid to construct a more secure and balanced col-
laborative grid environment.  
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